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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Accredo Health Group, Inc., a specialty pharmacy that 
provides home care for patients with hemophilia (a rare 
condition that prevents blood from clotting properly), made 
donations to charities, two of which allegedly recommended 
Accredo as an approved provider for hemophilia patients.  This 
raises whether the donations came with something expected in 
return for the recommendations, which might trigger violations 
of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), and, if 
so, whether Accredo’s healthcare reimbursement claims for 
persons who may have received the charities’ 
recommendations run afoul of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B).  No federal agency, however, made a 
claim against Accredo.  In stepped Steve Greenfield, a private 
citizen and a former area vice president of Accredo, who sued 
it and affiliates Medco Health Solutions, Inc., and Hemophilia 
Health Services, Inc. (for simplicity, all are referred to as 
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“Accredo”) for alleged violations of the two federal statutes.1  
If Greenfield prevailed, he would get at least 25% of any civil 
penalty or damages award.  
The District Court, at the end of discovery, entered 
summary judgment against Greenfield and for Accredo, and 
the Government here has chosen not to intervene.  It found that 
Greenfield failed to provide evidence of even a single federal 
claim for reimbursement by Accredo that was linked to the 
alleged kickback scheme.  As he disagrees, Greenfield appeals 
to us.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 Accredo delivers clotting medication (medically called 
“clotting factor”) to patients at their homes and provides 
nursing assistance that is tailored to hemophilia patients’ 
needs.  Along with its pharmaceutical services, Accredo makes 
donations to various charities, including two that are pertinent 
to this appeal: Hemophilia Services, Inc. (“HSI”), and 
Hemophilia Association of New Jersey (“HANJ,” and 
collectively with HSI, “HSI/HANJ”).  From 2007 to 2012, 
                                              
1 The legalese term for this type of private-suit piggybacking 
on federal statutes is a qui tam action.  “Qui tam is short for the 
Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our 
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.’”  Vt. Agency of Nat. 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 
(2000).  A private person, called a qui tam relator, brings an 
action “‘for the person and for the United States Government’ 
against the alleged false claimant, ‘in the name of the 
Government.’”  Id. at 769 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).  
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Accredo’s donations to HSI/HANJ ranged from approximately 
$200,000 to $550,000 on an annual basis.   
Accredo contributed funds to HSI, which in turn 
provided grants to HANJ.  HSI’s grants served two purposes—
an insurance program for patients who are not eligible for 
Medicare or Medicaid, and support for outpatient hemophilia 
treatment centers.  Accredo believed its donations went to 
HANJ’s insurance program, but was aware that HANJ also 
funded treatment centers. 
HANJ purportedly recognized Accredo’s contributions 
by identifying it as an HSI-approved provider or HSI-approved 
vendor on its website.  It stated HSI-approved vendors 
“maintain the highest quality of care while providing [a] 
continuity of services and constantly supporting the 
community in numerous ways.”  It also directed users to 
“[r]emember to work with our HSI [approved] providers” and 
included hyperlinks to the approved providers’ websites.  
HANJ also provided treatment centers with lists identifying 
specialty pharmacies that were designated as HSI-approved 
providers.  Accredo was noted in one list as one of four HSI-
approved vendors that “continually contribute to this 
community.”   
 Although Accredo donated approximately $363,000 to 
HSI/HANJ in 2010, it informed both charities that it planned 
to reduce its annual donation to $175,000 in the following year.  
In response, HSI sent a letter to its members informing them of 
Accredo’s reduced pledge and encouraging them to request 
that Accredo restore funding.  HSI’s letter focused on the 
possible shortfalls to HANJ’s private insurance program; in 
HSI’s view, Accredo’s funding cuts would “place[] the 
Insurance Program in jeopardy of being ‘phased out’ and 
ceasing to exist in the foreseeable future.”  HSI also forwarded 
a copy of the letter to treatment centers, stating that “[t]he 
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attached [letter] is self explanatory.  [Hemophilia Health 
Services]/Accredo has behaved despicably, while enjoying the 
fruits of HANJ’s labor.”   
 As a result of HSI’s letter, Accredo received 
approximately 75 letters from HSI members requesting an 
increase in funding.  It then asked Greenfield (as noted, an area 
vice president for Accredo) to analyze the potential return on 
investment if it were to increase its annual donation from 
$175,000 to $350,000.  It also requested him to project the 
“likely business deterioration to [its New Jersey] market share” 
if it opted not to increase funding.  Greenfield’s analysis 
indicated that, absent a funding increase to $350,000, “all new 
and existing business [could be] at risk,” and Accredo could 
expect to “lose 100% of the margin” associated with patients 
who switched out of Accredo’s services.  Based on this 
analysis, Accredo restored its annual donation to $350,000 in 
2012.   
 Greenfield thereafter filed a qui tam suit against 
Accredo, alleging it violated the False Claims Act by falsely 
certifying it complied with the Anti-Kickback Statute.2  
Although the statutory scheme gave the Government the option 
to intervene in the suit, it declined to do so.  See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(2).   
  The case proceeded to summary judgment, where the 
parties’ cross-motions presented differing theories on whether 
Greenfield had established a False Claims Act violation.  He 
argued Accredo violated the Act by paying kickbacks to 
HSI/HANJ in the form of charitable contributions to induce 
recommendations and referrals of Accredo by HSI/HANJ to its 
                                              
2 Greenfield initially brought multiple claims against Accredo, 
but his operative complaint alleges only False Claims Act 
violations. 
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members.  In Greenfield’s view, Accredo’s alleged kickback 
scheme amounted to a False Claims Act violation because at 
least some referrals or recommendations were directed to 
Medicare beneficiaries and because Accredo falsely certified 
compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute while submitting 
Medicare claims for payment.3  Accredo argued Greenfield 
could not prove a violation of the False Claims Act, as there 
was no evidence any federally insured patient purchased its 
prescriptions because of its contributions to HSI/HANJ. 
 The District Court denied Greenfield’s motion for 
summary judgment while granting that of Accredo.  In the 
Court’s view, his claim required him to (1) “establish that 
defendants violated the [Anti-Kickback Statute] through [their] 
alleged quid pro quo arrangement with HANJ/HSI” and (2) 
“show that, as a result of defendants’ [Anti-Kickback Statute] 
violation, defendants received payment from the federal 
government” in violation of the False Claims Act.  United 
States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sys., Inc., 223 F. 
Supp. 3d 222, 227 (D.N.J. 2016).  For purposes of its analysis, 
the Court did not determine whether Greenfield established an 
                                              
3 When billing Medicare for a federal claim, Accredo needed 
to certify its compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute on 
CMS Form 855s, which states in relevant part “I understand 
that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the 
claim and the underlying transaction complying with 
[Medicare] laws, regulations, and program instructions 
(including, but not limited to, the Federal [A]nti-[K]ickback 
[S]tatute . . . ), and on the supplier’s compliance with all 
applicable conditions of participation in Medicare.”   
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Anti-Kickback Statute violation.4  Instead, it focused its 
analysis on the second prong of the inquiry and concluded that, 
even if an Anti-Kickback Statute violation were assumed, 
Greenfield did not show sufficient evidence of a False Claims 
Act violation.   
 Although discovery revealed that Accredo submitted 
claims for 24 federally insured patients during the relevant time 
period, the Court concluded this evidence alone did not provide 
“the link between defendants’ 24 federally insured customers 
and defendants’ donations to HANJ/HSI.”  Id. at 230.  Instead, 
it explained Greenfield must show that federally insured 
patients were referred to Accredo as a result of its donations to 
HSI/HANJ.  “Absent some evidence . . . that those patients 
chose Accredo because of its donations to HANJ/HSI,” the 
Court reasoned, Greenfield could not carry his burden on his 
claim.  Id.  Thus it entered summary judgment for Accredo.  
 Greenfield appeals, arguing the District Court erred in 
requiring him to prove a direct link between the alleged 
kickback scheme and each false claim.  The Government 
appears as an amicus curiae in support of neither party, 
contending the Court erred to the extent it required Greenfield 
to prove that patients chose Accredo because of HSI/HANJ’s 
referrals and recommendations.  In its view, all that needed to 
be shown was a claim that sought reimbursement for medical 
care that was provided in violation of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.  In response, Accredo maintains, inter alia, that the 
District Court correctly stated Greenfield’s burden in 
establishing a False Claims Act breach. 
                                              
4 Like the District Court, we express no view on whether 
Accredo’s charitable contributions were illegal kickbacks 
under the Anti-Kickback Statute.  
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Our review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment is de novo.  See Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is proper 
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non[-
]moving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986).  The non-moving party must “go beyond the 
pleadings” and “designate specific facts” in the record 
“showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 
preclude the entry of summary judgment.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. 
at 248.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  Must an HSI/HANJ Member Subjectively 
Choose to Use Accredo Because of the Alleged 
Kickback Scheme? 
As noted, Greenfield contends the District Court erred 
by requiring a direct “link” between the donations to 
HSI/HANJ by Accredo and its 24 federally insured customers.  
He argues Accredo violated the False Claims Act because it 
certified compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute while 
paying HSI/HANJ via donations in exchange for 
recommendations.  Accordingly, he claims no need to identify 
specific false claims related directly to the alleged kickback 
scheme.   
 1.  The False Claims Act  
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 The False Claims Act imposes liability on any person 
who “(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false 
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] (B) 
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”5  
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).  A false or fraudulent claim may be 
either factually false or legally false.  “A claim is factually false 
when the claimant misrepresents what goods or services . . . it 
provided to the Government. . . .”  United States ex rel. Wilkins 
                                              
5 Although Congress amended the False Claims Act in 2009 by 
enacting the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (“FERA”), 
it did not substantially alter the provisions of the pre-FERA 
version of the False Claims Act, which imposed liability on  
 
any person who—  
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government or a member of the 
Armed Forces of the United States a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] 
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement to get a false 
or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government.   
 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2).  
 
Because only § 3729(a)(1)(B) of FERA is retroactive to June 
7, 2008, both the pre-FERA and FERA versions of the False 
Claims Act apply in our case.  See Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 4(f)(1), 123 Stat. 
1617, 1625 (2009).  The minor differences in the two versions 
of the statute do not affect our analysis.  
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v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011).  
It is legally false when the claimant lies about its compliance 
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement.  See id.   
Where, as here, a plaintiff contends a defendant’s claim 
is legally false, he or she must also prove the defendant’s 
misrepresentation about its compliance with a legal 
requirement is “material to the Government’s payment 
decision.”  Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016).  “[P]roof of materiality 
can include, but is not necessarily limited to, evidence that the 
defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to 
pay claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance 
with the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement.”  Id. at 2003. 
  2. The Anti-Kickback Statute 
To repeat, Greenfield contends Accredo’s claims were 
legally false because they were incorrectly certified as 
compliant with the Anti-Kickback Statute.  In pertinent part, 
the Statute prohibits “knowingly and willfully” offering or 
paying “any remuneration . . . to any person to induce such 
person . . . to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing 
. . . of any item or service for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under a Federal health care program.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A).  It also prohibits “knowingly and 
willfully solicit[ing] or receiv[ing]” kickbacks “in return” for 
such conduct.  Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A).   
Congress amended the Anti-Kickback Statute in 2010 
to provide “a claim that includes items or services resulting 
from a violation of [that Statute] constitutes a false or 
fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims Act].”  Id. 
§ 1320a-7b(g).  Although the amendment is not retroactive, see 
Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 312 n.19, plaintiffs may still bring a False 
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Claims Act case for claims submitted before 2010, as the 
amendment “clarif[ied], [but did] not alter, existing law that 
claims for payment made pursuant to illegal kickbacks are false 
under the False Claims Act,” United States ex rel. 
Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D. Mass. 
2011); see also United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 
382 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2004) (False Claims Act case 
premised on alleged Anti-Kickback Statute violations brought 
before the Anti-Kickback Statute was amended in 2010).   
  3. Proving a False Claims Act Violation at  
   Summary Judgment 
  As noted, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Accredo because Greenfield did not link its claims 
for reimbursement to the alleged kickback scheme.  Indeed, its 
holding went further than that, arguably requiring a causal 
relationship — Greenfield must provide “some evidence” that 
federal beneficiaries “chose Accredo because of its donations 
to HANJ/HSI.”  Greenfield, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 230.  That 
evidence, in the Court’s view, is “an essential element” of 
Greenfield’s claim.  Id. 
 Greenfield and the Government contend that proof of 
subjective intent is not required.  They assert Congress enacted 
the False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback Statute to impose 
liability independent of patients’ subjective medical decisions.  
Accredo counters that the statutory scheme requires Greenfield 
to prove that federal beneficiaries would not have used 
Accredo’s services but for the alleged kickback violation.  It 
insists that this is the correct evidentiary burden, even if it 
would require plaintiffs to delve into patients’ intent.  At issue, 
therefore, is what “link” is sufficient to connect an alleged 
kickback scheme to a subsequent claim for reimbursement: a 
direct causal link, no link at all, or something in between.   
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 When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur task is to give 
effect to the will of Congress, and where Congress’s will has 
been expressed in language that has a reasonably plain 
meaning, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive.”  Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Where a statute’s language is arguably not plain, we 
consider statutory language “in the larger context or structure 
of the statute in which it is found.”  United States v. Tupone, 
442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Alli v. Decker, 650 
F.3d 1007, 1012 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).  Our effort to discern 
Congress’s intent may resort to legislative history as an aid or 
cross-check.  See Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 
223 (2d Cir. 2006).  
For convenience, we repeat that, under the Anti-
Kickback Statute, “a claim that includes items and services 
resulting from a violation of [that Statute] constitutes a false or 
fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims Act].”  42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g).  The Statute does not define the term 
“resulting from.”  However, Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“result” as “a . . . logical . . . or legal consequence; to proceed 
as an outcome or conclusion.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014). 
 In line with this definition, Accredo argues its 
interpretation of “resulting from” is consistent with how the 
Supreme Court has construed those words in other statutes, 
most notably the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 
et seq.  See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887-88 
(2014) (“‘Results from’ imposes, in other words, a requirement 
of actual causality. . . .  [T]his requires proof the harm would 
not have occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—the 
defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
The Government responds that imposing but-for causation in 
this context would lead to the incongruous result whereby “a 
defendant could be convicted of criminal conduct under the 
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[Anti-Kickback Statute] for paying kickbacks to induce 
medical referrals, but would be insulated from civil [False 
Claims Act] liability for the exact same conduct, absent 
additional proof that each medical decision was in fact 
corrupted by the kickbacks.”  Gov’t Amicus Br. at 22. 
 To determine if a particular reading of a statute 
produces incongruous results, we ask whether that reading is 
consistent with the drafters’ intentions.  See United States v. 
Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2002).  It appears the drafters 
of the Anti-Kickback Statute intended “to strengthen the 
capability of the Government to detect, prosecute, and punish 
fraudulent activities under the [M]edicare and [M]edicaid 
programs,” H.R. Rep. No. 95-393, at 1 (1977), because “fraud 
and abuse among practitioners . . . is relatively difficult to 
prove and correct,” id. at 47.  “Since the medical needs of a 
particular patient can be highly judgmental, it is difficult to 
identify program abuse as a practical manner unless the 
overutilization is grossly unreasonable.”  Id.  This counsels 
requiring something less than proof that the underlying 
medical care would not have been provided but for a kickback.  
 Similarly, Congress passed § 1320a-7b(g) in 2010 as 
part of an overall effort to “strengthen[] whistleblower actions 
based on medical care kickbacks” and “to ensure that all claims 
resulting from illegal kickbacks are considered false claims for 
the purpose of civil action[s] under the False Claims Act.”  155 
Cong. Rec. S10852, S10853-54 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2009) (Sen. 
Kaufman) (emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. 
Kester v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 323, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“There is no indication in either the law itself 
or the legislative history that Congress intended to narrow the 
scope of ‘falsity’ under the [False Claims Act] when it 
amended the [Anti-Kickback Statute] to add Section 1320a–
7b(g).”).  Although the legislative history of the provision does 
not explain the term “resulting from,” the Congressional 
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Record indicates it was enacted to avert “legal challenges that 
sometimes defeat legitimate enforcement efforts.”  155 Cong. 
Rec. at S10853.   
 The False Claims Act’s legislative history echoes 
these points.  There Congress stated the “Act is intended to 
reach all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay 
ou[t] sums of money or to deliver property or services,” and 
“[a] false claim for reimbursement under Medicare, Medicaid, 
or similar program . . . may be false even though the services 
are provided as claimed.”  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9 (1986) 
(emphasis added).  Thus the Anti-Kickback Statute and False 
Claims Act were not drafted to cabin healthcare providers’ 
liability for certain types of false claims or for certain types of 
illegal kickbacks.  Instead, Congress intended both statutes to 
reach a broad swath of “fraud and abuse” in the federal 
healthcare system.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-393 at 47 (1977). 
 As such, the Government correctly observes that 
Accredo’s reading of § 1320a-7b(g) is inconsistent with the 
drafters’ intentions underlying both statutes.  Per Accredo’s 
reasoning, a plaintiff would have to prove a kickback actually 
influenced a patient’s or medical professional’s judgment.  
Such a requirement would hamper False Claims Act cases 
under that provision even though Congress enacted it to 
“strengthen[] whistleblower actions based on medical care 
kickbacks,” 155 Cong. Rec. at S10853, and stated that 
healthcare fraud “is relatively difficult to prove and correct,” 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-393, at 47.  Moreover, it would dilute the 
False Claims Act’s requirements vis-à-vis the Anti-Kickback 
Statute, as direct causation would be a precondition to bringing 
a False Claims Act case but not an Anti-Kickback Statute 
case.6  It follows that the broad statutory context of the False 
                                              
6 Although Congress did not intend two different standards of 
causation to apply in False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback 
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Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback Statute supports the 
Government’s reading, as neither requires a plaintiff to show 
that a kickback directly influenced a patient’s decision to use a 
particular medical provider.  Accordingly, Accredo’s 
interpretation of § 1320a-7b(g) does not control the inquiry 
here, as it would lead to results not intended by Congress. 
 Case law from our Court supports this conclusion.  In 
Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 314, we stated that a participant in a 
federal healthcare program complies with the False Claims Act 
by “refrain[ing] from offering or entering into payment 
arrangements which violate the [Anti-Kickback Statute], while 
making claims for payment to the Government under that 
program.”  Id. at 314.  We observed that “[t]he Government 
does not get what it bargained for when a defendant is paid . . 
. for services tainted by a kickback.”7  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original).   
                                              
Statute cases, it is worth repeating that the elements of the 
statutes differ.  Unlike the False Claims Act, the Anti-Kickback 
Statute criminalizes a “knowing[] and willful[] offer” to pay a 
kickback.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).  Thus an offer alone 
may amount to a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, but is 
not enough to prove a violation of the False Claims Act.  See 
id. § 1320a-7b(g) (“[A] claim that includes items or services 
resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or 
fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims Act].” 
(emphasis added)).  
 
7 Other courts have gone further, expressly stating that 
causation is not required in this context.  For instance, in 
United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 
647 F.3d 377, 393 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the claims “were not false or 
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 Our view is also consistent with the language in CMS 
Form 855s, which requires providers to certify that “the claim 
and the underlying transaction” (i.e., the medical care being 
reimbursed) comply with the Anti-Kickback Statute.  As is 
apparent from its language, the Form directs the provider’s 
attention to the medical care that is the subject of a claim.  It 
makes no mention of a patient’s reason(s) for selecting a 
specific provider and does not require a provider to engage in 
an intent-based inquiry before submitting a claim for 
reimbursement.   
 The Government presented several hypotheticals to 
illustrate this standard.  For example, “if a medical service 
provider pays kickbacks to a doctor to induce referrals and then 
submits claims to Medicare for services it provided to patients 
who were referred by that doctor, the claims are false because 
the medical care was not provided in compliance with the 
[Anti-Kickback Statute].”  Gov’t Amicus Br. at 17.  This 
outcome is the same “regardless of whether the doctor would 
have referred the patients absent the kickbacks . . . and 
                                              
fraudulent because [they] were for services that would have 
been provided in the absence of the alleged [Anti-Kickback 
Statute] violations.”  Instead, the Court concluded “the . . . 
claims were ineligible for payment” because “the underlying 
transaction violated the [Anti-Kickback Statute].”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  More recently, the Southern District 
of New York rejected a defendant’s argument pressing the 
same theory of causation Accredo now advances, reasoning 
that “Congress gave absolutely no indication . . . it intended . . 
. to limit the [False Claims Act’s] reach where kickbacks were 
concerned” and that “any claim connected in any way to an 
[Anti-Kickback Statute] violation [is] ineligible for 
reimbursement” under § 1320a-7b(g).  Kester, 41 F. Supp. 3d 
at 332, 335.  
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regardless of whether the patients would have chosen the 
service provider absent the referral.”  Id.   
 Consistent with this standard, Greenfield does not 
need to prove HSI/HANJ’s referrals actually caused their 
members to use a particular healthcare provider.  A “link” is 
required, but it is less than espoused by Accredo: For a False 
Claims Act violation, Greenfield must prove that at least one 
of Accredo’s claims sought reimbursement for medical care 
that was provided in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (as 
a kickback renders a subsequent claim ineligible for payment).8  
How this plays out is where we turn.  
B. Assuming There Was an Anti-Kickback 
Statute Violation, What Must Greenfield 
Provide to Prevail at Summary Judgment for 
a False Claims Act Violation?  
 Even under our reading of the statute, Greenfield 
contends the District Court erred by requiring him to show an 
actual claim linked to Accredo’s alleged kickback scheme.  He 
argues this is too stringent a requirement.  In his view, a 
temporal connection is sufficient to prove a False Claims Act 
violation at summary judgment.  Because Accredo’s 
contributions to HSI, its forwarding those monies to HANJ, 
                                              
8 Even if Greenfield proves that one of Accredo’s claims 
sought reimbursement for medical care that was provided in 
breach of the Statute, he must also satisfy the False Claims 
Act’s materiality requirement, as falsity and materiality are 
distinct requirements in this context.  See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2002 (“[A] misrepresentation about compliance with a 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be 
material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be 
actionable under the False Claims Act.”).  
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HSI/HANJ recommending Accredo as an approved provider to 
their members, and Accredo filing reimbursement claims for 
24 federally insured patients all took place in close proximity 
between 2007 and 2012, Greenfield contends Accredo 
necessarily violated the False Claims Act because all of its 24 
claims incorrectly certified that it did not pay any illegal 
kickbacks.   
 We disagree.  A plaintiff cannot “merely . . . describe 
a private scheme in detail but then . . . allege . . . that claims 
requesting illegal payments must have been submitted, were 
likely submitted[,] or should have been submitted to the 
Government.”  United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of 
Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002).9  Instead, he must 
provide “evidence of the actual submission of a false claim” to 
prevail at summary judgment.  Quinn, 382 F.3d at 439.   
 Consistent with these principles, we rejected a similar 
argument in Quinn, where the plaintiff argued the defendant 
violated the False Claims Act by reselling unused, returned 
medications that were already paid by Medicaid (i.e., “recycled 
medications”) and then submitting a second Medicaid claim 
for the medication’s full value.  See id.  According to the 
relator, “false claims must have been submitted” because the 
defendant admitted that “approximately 60 percent of its 
business is Medicaid and that it accepts returned medications 
for recycling.”  Id. at 440.  We held that argument insufficient 
                                              
9 Although the Eleventh Circuit stated the above in the context 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s pleading 
requirements, its statement also is apt during summary 
judgment because a non-movant’s “evidentiary burden . . . in a 
summary judgment motion is significantly greater than in 
a motion to dismiss.”  Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 
(5th Cir. 1991). 
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to survive summary judgment because the relator did not show 
“a single claim that [the defendant] actually submitted to 
Medicaid which covered a [recycled] medication for which 
[the defendant] had previously submitted a claim.”  Id.  With 
this failure “to link [the defendant’s] recycling and crediting 
practices to the actual submission of a false claim,” there was 
no genuine “issue of material fact to be decided by a jury.”  Id.; 
see also Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 308 (“It is true that to recover 
under the [False Claims Act] we have recognized 
that ultimately a plaintiff must come forward with at least a 
‘single false [or fraudulent] claim’ that the defendants 
submitted to the Government for payment.” (quoting Quinn, 
382 F.3d at 440) (emphasis omitted)).  
 Our sister circuits have applied the same analysis, 
holding that plaintiffs must provide evidence of at least one 
false claim to prevail on summary judgment.  For example, in 
United States ex rel. Booker v. Pfizer, Inc., 847 F.3d 52, 58 (1st 
Cir. 2017), the First Circuit held that “aggregate [information] 
reflecting the amount of money expended by Medicaid” on off-
label prescriptions was “insufficient on its own to support a[] 
[False Claims Act] claim” because it did not show “an actual 
false claim made to the [G]overnment.”  Likewise, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded a plaintiff failed to carry his burden during 
summary judgment because he failed to provide any claim 
associated with the defendant’s alleged Medicare fraud.  
United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 
F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Kitsap 
Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It seems 
to be a fairly obvious notion that a False Claims Act suit ought 
to require a false claim.  Yet, the plaintiff-appellant in this case 
filed his action, proceeded to summary judgment, and 
prosecuted this appeal without ever seeing or presenting to a 
court a single false claim submitted by the defendants-
appellees.  This flaw is fatal to a qui tam action under the False 
Claims Act.”).   
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 It follows that Greenfield may not prevail on summary 
judgment simply by demonstrating that Accredo submitted 
federal claims while allegedly paying kickbacks.  Nor may he 
prevail by hypothesizing that at least some of HSI/HANJ’s 
recommendations must have been directed to federal 
beneficiaries because Accredo submitted claims for 24 
federally insured patients during the relevant time period.  
Instead, he must point to at least one claim that covered a 
patient who was recommended or referred to Accredo by 
HSI/HANJ.   
 He has not done so here.  He fails to demonstrate that 
any of Accredo’s 24 federally insured patients viewed 
HSI/HANJ’s approved provider list or that HSI/HANJ referred 
the federally insured patients to Accredo through some other 
means.  He even fails to establish that the 24 federally insured 
patients were members of HSI/HANJ and thus recipients of 
HSI/HANJ’s communications.  The closest he comes is when 
he asks us to assume that all 24 were members because 
“[e]ssentially all hemophiliacs in New Jersey are HANJ 
members.”  Reply Br. at 5.  But “it is impossible to rule out the 
chance” that none of the 24 were HSI/HANJ members or that 
none of the 24 members were exposed to an illegal referral or 
recommendation.  Quinn, 382 F.3d at 443.  Thus the evidence 
does not link Accredo’s alleged kickback scheme to any 
particular claim.   
 Despite this evidentiary shortcoming, Greenfield 
insists that the taint of a kickback renders every reimbursement 
claim false.  Because Accredo was violating the Anti-Kickback 
Statute while submitting federal claims for reimbursement, he 
argues, the alleged kickbacks need not have any connection to 
the claims or the underlying medical care.  Again we disagree.  
A kickback does not morph into a false claim unless a 
particular patient is exposed to an illegal recommendation or 
referral and a provider submits a claim for reimbursement 
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pertaining to that patient.  Even if we assume Accredo paid 
illegal kickbacks, that is not enough to establish that the 
underlying medical care to any of the 24 patients was 
connected to a breach of the Anti-Kickback Statute; we must 
have some record evidence that shows a link between the 
alleged kickbacks and the medical care received by at least one 
of Accredo’s 24 federally insured patients.  Because Greenfield 
provides no such evidence (not that any of the 24 received a 
referral or recommendation to use Accredo’s services or even 
that any of the 24 were members of HSI/HANJ), his case 
cannot proceed to trial.  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly entered summary judgment for Accredo.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits kickbacks 
regardless of their effect on patients’ medical decisions.  
Because any kickback violation is not eligible for 
reimbursement, to certify otherwise violates the False Claims 
Act.  Yet there must be some connection between a kickback 
and a subsequent reimbursement claim.  It is not enough, as 
Greenfield contends, to show temporal proximity between 
Accredo’s alleged kickback plot and the submission of claims 
for reimbursement.  Likewise, it is too exacting to follow 
Accredo’s approach, which requires a relator to prove that 
federal beneficiaries would not have used the relevant services 
absent the alleged kickback scheme.  Instead, Greenfield must 
show, at a minimum, that at least one of the 24 federally 
insured patients for whom Accredo provided services and 
submitted reimbursement claims was exposed to a referral or 
recommendation of Accredo by HSI/HANJ in violation of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute.  Because he has failed to do so, we 
affirm. 
